items:
*THIRD WORLD NETWORK intro
*Renewed calls to ban Terminator Technology
*Why Terminator Technology Won't Prevent GM Contamination
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Renewed calls to ban Terminator Technology as CBD meets
Date : 24 January 2006
THIRD WORLD NETWORK BIOSAFETY INFORMATION SERVICE
Dear Friends and colleagues,
RE: Renewed calls to ban Terminator Technology as CBD meets
Governments are gathering from 23-27 January for the fourth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Intersessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and related provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity in Granda, Spain. One of the key items on the agenda is with regards to the potential socio-economic impacts of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) on indigenous and local communities (Item 1).
Terminator Technology, which is one of the GURTs under development, is an extremely controversial application of genetic engineering. It renders seeds sterile at harvest, thus preventing farmers from saving and re-using seed, and forcing them to return to corporations to buy seed every season.
Although the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has a "de facto" moratorium on the field-testing and commercialization of GURTs, it is under threat, as there have been increased efforts by industry and some governments to overturn this.
Moreover, industry is now presenting the technology as suitable for "biological containment", to prevent gene flow. However, this is a false argument as Terminator is not a reliable gene containment system for both technical and practical reasons (Item 2).
For example, Terminator crops will still produce pollen and could cross with neighbouring non-genetically engineered or organic crops. So gene flow could still occur, with potentially catastrophic impacts on agrobiodiversity and biodiversity, and on seed saving.
It is crucial that the Working Group on 8(j) makes strong and conclusive recommendations against GURTs. Civil society groups are calling for an international ban on Terminator Technology.
For more information, please visit www.banterminator.org
With best wishes,
Lim Li Ching
Third World Network
121-S Jalan Utama
10450 Penang
Malaysia
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.biosafety-info.net and www.twnside.org.sg
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Renewed calls to ban Terminator Technology as CBD meets
REF Doc.TWN/Biosafety/2005/B
Item 1
Kuala Lumpur, 23 January (Lim Li Ching) – As governments gather for the fourth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Intersessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and related provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, indigenous peoples, farmers’ groups and NGOs are renewing their calls for an international ban on the "Terminator Technology", because of its serious threat to livelihoods, food security and agricultural biodiversity. The 8(j) Working Group will meet from 23-27 January in Granada, Spain.
Terminator Technology, which is one of the Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) under development, is an extremely controversial application of genetic engineering. Terminator was designed by the multinational seed industry and the United States Department of Agriculture to render seeds sterile at harvest, thus preventing farmers from saving and re-using seed, and forcing them to return to corporations to buy seed every season.
This poses a threat to the millions of farmers, particularly in developing countries, who depend on farm saved seed for their survival. Furthermore, there would be adverse impacts on the practice and retention of the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and farmers that, in turn, supports food security, self-determination, cultural and spiritual practices, and the protection of biodiversity around the world.
Ten multinational corporations are now estimated to control around half of all the world’s seed supply. This consolidation has been facilitated by biotechnology and the advent of patents on genes and seeds and Terminator would further add to this corporate control.
In 1999, in response to an avalanche of public opposition, two of the world’s largest seed and agrochemical corporations, Monsanto and AstraZeneca (now Syngenta), publicly vowed not to commercialize Terminator seeds.
In 2000, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) adopted Decision V/5 (Agricultural biological diversity) section III, paragraph 23, which recommends that Parties not approve GURTs for field testing or commercial use, thereby establishing a "de facto" moratorium on GURTs.
The relevant part of the decision reads: "Recommends that, in the current absence of reliable data on genetic use restriction technologies, without which there is an inadequate basis on which to assess their potential risks, and in accordance with the precautionary approach, products incorporating such technologies should not be approved by Parties for field testing until appropriate scientific data can justify such testing, and for commercial use until appropriate, authorized and strictly controlled scientific assessments with regard to, inter alia, their ecological and socio-economic impacts and any adverse effects for biological diversity, food security and human health have been carried out in a transparent manner and the conditions for their safe and beneficial use validated. In order to enhance the capacity of all countries to address these issues, Parties should widely disseminate information on scientific assessments, including through the clearing-house mechanism, and share their expertise in this regard."
However, the CBD's "de facto" moratorium on Terminator is now seriously threatened, as there have been increased efforts made by industry and some governments to overturn the previous decision on GURTs.
At the tenth meeting of the CBD's intergovernmental scientific advisory body - the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) - in February 2005, the Canadian government led efforts by some Parties to overturn the CBD's existing "de facto" moratorium in favor of national approval for the field testing and commercial use of GURTs. They were unsuccessful in this respect, and Decision V/5 was reaffirmed due to the interventions of other Parties, but the threat of Terminator looming its head again remains.
Simultaneously, multinational seed corporations are increasing pressure to win acceptance for Terminator: *In 2003, Monsanto and Delta and Pine Land seed company representatives co-authored the International Seed Federation position paper promoting Terminator.
*In March 2004, Syngenta (the world’s largest agrochemical company and holder of the most Terminator patents) won another Terminator patent (US 6,700,039). This, despite Syngenta stating that it will not commercialize the technology. *In February 2005, Delta & Pine Land (DPL) actively promoted Terminator (the company calls it a "Technology Protection System") at SBSTTA-10.
*On 5 October 2005, DPL and the US Department of Agriculture won a new patent on Terminator from the European Patent Office (EP 775212B). *On 11 October 2005, DPL and the US Department of Agriculture were awarded a Canadian patent on Terminator (CA 2196410).
In addition, corporations like Delta and Pine Land, the company behind Terminator, are now presenting Terminator as "enhancing biosafety and biodiversity". This company and many others, including Monsanto and Syngenta, were damaged by the initial international protest against their plans in the late 1990s.
Having been pressed by public opinion to make statements that they would not develop Terminator crops, they now seem to be seeking a more acceptable image for their intentions. To allay fears about contamination from genetically engineered crops, they are now presenting the technology as suitable for "biological containment", to prevent gene flow, which is one of the recognized threats of genetically engineered crops.
However, Terminator is not a reliable gene containment system for both technical and practical reasons. It is not a biosafety tool and cannot be 100% effective. Conversely, Terminator crops, like other genetically engineered crops, may pose threats to the environment and human health.
In the first place, biological containment systems cannot help reduce or eliminate contamination of food, feed or seed with genetically engineered genes, that is a result of accidental mixing after harvest or during transport and processing.
Terminator is also a complex and largely experimental system that has several shortcomings in terms of gene containment. Terminator crops will still produce pollen and could cross with neighbouring non-genetically engineered or organic crops. So gene flow could still occur, with potentially catastrophic impacts on agrobiodiversity and biodiversity, and on seed saving.
Furthermore, because the system relies on a chemical sensitive genetic switch to ultimately activate a toxin gene that prevents seed germination, the chemical would need to be applied to the seed before it is sold.
However, the treatment of seeds may not be completely effective. The effect may be sufficient to make saving seed an unreliable exercise for farmers, but not enough for complete gene containment. The chemical sensitive genetic switch may also be activated by some of the plant’s own chemicals or may not be completely switched off all the time. This ‘leakage’ could lead to fertile seeds being produced, and thus the failure of Terminator to prevent gene flow.
Other problems, such as gene silencing or instability of one component, could lead to failure of the whole system. Gene silencing is one phenomenon seen in genetically engineered crops that arises from the introduction of foreign genes. Furthermore, the genes forming the Terminator system have to be linked together to work properly, so if they split during reproduction, the system would fail.
The industry’s spin recasting Terminator as effective in preventing genetic contamination and gene flow from genetically engineered crops is seriously flawed. In fact, Terminator’s only real value is to benefit corporations economically, by forcing farmers to buy seed every season.
The efforts to overturn the CBD’s "de facto" moratorium on Terminator are expected to continue at next week’s 8(j) Working Group meeting, which has been asked "to consider the potential socio-economic impacts of genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs) on indigenous and local communities".
The 8(j) Working Group was established by the CBD to specifically address the implementation of Article 8(j) and related provisions of the Convention. Article 8(j) deals with issues related to the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
The Working Group is likely to make recommendations on the potential socio-economic impacts of GURTs to the eighth meeting of the CBD’s Conference of the Parties (COP 8), to be held in Curitiba, Brazil from 20-31 March 2006.
Terminator had already proven to be a "hot potato" issue, passing among various CBD bodies, starting from when the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on Genetic Use Restriction Technologies met in February 2003 to consider the potential impacts of GURTs on smallholder farmers, indigenous and local communities.
Its report was critical of Terminator and noted the potential negative socio-economic and cultural impacts. In fact, in addition to reaffirming Decision V/5 III, the AHTEG report recommended that Parties and other Governments "consider the development of regulatory frameworks not to approve GURTs for field-testing and commercial use."
However, the AHTEG report has been criticized by some Parties (who are unhappy with the overall tone of the report which is critical of Terminator) for not representing a consensus viewpoint and for not being "scientific". The AHTEG report was sent to SBSTTA-9, as well as the third meeting of the 8(j) Working Group for consideration and advice in 2003.
At the third meeting of the 8(j) Working Group, held in December 2003, a draft recommendation was drafted on GURTs. However, some representatives considered that there had been insufficient time to adequately address the issue, which they argued required further in-depth assessment and discussion. The Working Group thus recommended that its next meeting (i.e. the meeting in Granada next week) be the forum to consider the potential socio-economic impacts of GURTs on indigenous and local communities.
Meanwhile, SBSTTA-9 avoided the controversial issue by claiming it was unable to provide advice because of the broad agenda before it and proceeded to transmit the AHTEG report to the Conference of the Parties (COP 7) while recommending that COP 7 requests SBSTTA-10 to provide advice on GURTs to COP 8.
In February 2004, COP 7 in turn, urged the 8(j) Working Group to consider the potential socio-economic impacts of GURTs on indigenous and local communities, on the basis of the report of the AHTEG on GURTs, the outcome of deliberations of SBSTTA-10, and a study undertaken by the FAO, on potential impacts of GURTs on agricultural biodiversity and agricultural production systems. When SBSTTA-10 met in February 2005, it could not reach consensus on the AHTEG report.
This is the crossroads at which the world stands now on Terminator, following a long, tortuous route and repeated delays in seriously addressing the issue. It thus seems that the 8(j) Working Group meeting in Granada will be in a unique position to make strong and conclusive recommendations to COP 8.
Civil society groups have thus stepped up their efforts to ensure that Terminator is banned once and for all, and formed the Ban Terminator Campaign (www.banterminator.org) in 2005.
The Campaign is supported by groups and movements across the world including AS-PTA (Assessoria e Serviços a Projectos em Agricultura Alternativa), ETC Group (Action group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration), GRAIN, Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism, ITDG (Intermediate Technology Development Group), Pesticide Action Network – Asia and the Pacific, Third World Network and Via Campesina.
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Why Terminator Technology Won’t Prevent GM Contamination
Item 2
GeneWatch UK Briefing
January 2006
Terminator technology brings potential social and economic implications for the millions of farmers in developing countries who rely on farm-saved seed for survival. Terminator should never be allowed on these grounds alone. However, it is also not a reliable gene containment system for both technical and practical reasons.
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Box: What are Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs)?
There are two types of GURTs:
• v-GURTs: where the use of the GM crop variety is controlled through seed sterility
• t-GURTs: where the use of a GM trait (such as disease resistance) is controlled
GURTs were designed because conventional ways of preventing copying, such as patent protection, are difficult to enforce for plants which are self-reproducing. GURTs use a chemical sensitive genetic switch system which is turned on or off by the external application of a chemical. This switch is linked to either a sterility trait in v-GURTs or the GM trait in t-GURTs. The company controls the seed or trait via access to the chemical to be applied. Both types of GURT are still in the development and testing stage.
GURTs as a whole are also known as ‘Traitor technology’ and v-GURTs as ‘Terminator technology’.
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What is biological gene containment?
Biological containment uses genetic modification (GM) techniques aimed at preventing cross-pollination or preventing seed from a GM crop, or a cross with a GM crop, being viable or persistent. Biological containment systems cannot help reduce or eliminate contamination of food, feed or seed caused as a result of accidental mixing after harvest or during transport and processing. Although a range of different techniques for biological containment has been proposed, none of them is in commercial use for containment purposes and most are far from being ready to apply. For a variety of technical reasons, none of them will ever be 100% effective or applicable in all situations.
Terminator Technology, one form of ‘Genetic Use Restriction Technologies’ (GURTs – see Box) has been proposed as a biological containment mechanism to limit gene flow from GM crops, by preventing any seed that is produced from being able to germinate or persist in the environment.
Seed sterility (Terminator technology)
This is one of the most contested applications of GM to crops. It involves genetic modification of a plant so that the seed from the crop will not germinate if farmers keep it for resowing.1 Like Traitor technology (see Box), Terminator technology uses a chemical sensitive genetic switch (responsive, for example, to alcohol or the antibiotic tetracycline) linked to a gene for an enzyme which activates a toxin gene.2,3 When the toxin gene is switched on, it becomes active in the late stage of seed formation; it does not prevent the seed forming but will prevent it germinating. The genetic switch may act either to suppress or activate the enzyme and toxin so switches germination either on or off. It is anticipated that the switch would generally be used to suppress germination – the chemical would be applied to the seed before it is sold to farmers to prevent seed saving and resowing. In terms of gene containment, because the seed is sterile, any hybrids formed will be sterile and seed shed at harvest will not survive and germinate in later years: one dimension of gene flow is limited. However, the system is complex and largely experimental and has several shortcomings in terms of gene containment.4
• Terminator crops will still produce pollen and could cross with neighbouring non-GM or organic crops. The GM traits could therefore contaminate non-GM food or feed and compromise fertility if farmers had been intending to save seed from their crops.
• Treatment of seeds before sale may not be completely effective. In fact, for any use of genetic switches, it is difficult to imagine that sufficient chemical could be applied to millions of seeds or the growing crop in sufficient concentrations to reliably trigger the switch in every case. The effect may be sufficient to make saving seed an unreliable exercise for farmers, but not enough for complete gene containment.
• There may be gene silencing or instability of one component leading to failure of the system. Depending on which gene was affected, there would be seed sterility at the wrong time (during seed production), or it would not occur when required (after sale to farmers). Gene silencing is one phenomenon seen in GM crops that arises from the introduction of foreign genes.
• The chemical sensitive genetic switch may be activated by some of the plant’s own chemicals or may not be completely switched off all the time. This ‘leakage’ could lead to fertile seeds being produced. Some of the chemicals used in studies using such switch technology can be harmful to the plant.5
• The genes forming the Terminator system have to be linked together to work properly. If they split during reproduction, the system would fail.
References
1. RAFI (1998) Terminator technology targets farmers. Communique. www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=188.
2. US patent 5723765 USDA/Delta and Pine Land.
3. Odell JT, Hoopes JL and Vermerris W (1994) Seed-specific gene activation mediated by the Cre/lox site-specific recombination system. Plant Physiology 106, 447-58.
4. Daniell H (2002) Molecular strategies for gene containment in transgenic crops. Nature Biotechnology 20, 581-6. 5. Padidam M (2003) Chemically regulated gene expression in plants. Current Opinion in Plant Biology 6, 169-77.
Extracted from "GM CONTAMINATION: Can biological containment work for crops and society?" Gene Watch UK Briefing Number 33, December 2005. http://www.genewatch.org/publications/Briefs/brief33.pdf
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